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Abstract
We present a deterministic method to compute the Gaussian average of
neural networks used in regression and classification. Our method is based
on an equivalence between training with a particular regularized loss, and
the expected values of Gaussian averages. We use this equivalence to certify
models which perform well on clean data but are not robust to adversarial
perturbations. In terms of certified accuracy and adversarial robustness,
our method is comparable to known stochastic methods such as randomized
smoothing, but requires only a single model evaluation during inference.
1 Introduction
Neural networks are very accurate on image classification tasks, but they are vulnerable
to adversarial perturbations, i.e. small changes to the model input leading to misclassifica-
tion (Szegedy et al., 2014). Adversarial training Madry et al. (2018) improves robustness, but
does not solve the problem completely. A complementary approach is certification: find the
greatest amount of perturbation that can be added to an input example before the model’s
performance is compromised (Lécuyer et al., 2019; Raghunathan et al., 2018; Cohen et al.,
2019). This means that, given a model f and an input x, we wish to certify a minimum
distance so that the classification of f(x + η) is constant for all perturbations below the
certified distance.
One promising approach to certification is to certify models within a given Gaussian region
(Cohen et al., 2019; Salman et al., 2019). That is, a model f should satisfy
f(x) ≈ Eη [f(x+ η)] (1)
where η ∼ N (0, σ2I) and x is a given example. While this is not easily attainable in practice,
it is possible to obtain a new “smoothed” model v that is the expected Gaussian average of
our initial model f at a given input example x,
v(x) ≈ Eη [f(x+ η)] (2)
The works of Cohen et al. and Salman et al. both obtain this Gaussian smoothed model (2)
stochastically. The idea is that by defining the classification of the stochastic model to be
the mode (most popular prediction) of the classifications given by ensembles f(x+ η1), f(x+
η2), . . . , we achieve a more robust ensemble. While ensemble models are generally more
robust, the main advantage of the Gaussian ensemble is that we can obtain certified bounds
based on probabilistic arguments. However, like all ensemble models, it requires multiple
inferences, which can be undesirable when computation is costly.
In this work we present a deterministic model whose outputs are equivalent to the outputs
of the Gaussian smoothed model v(x) given by (2). While it is generally not possible to
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Figure 1: Illustration of gradient regularization in the binary classification setting. The lighter
line represents classification boundary for original model with large gradients, and the darker line
represents classification boundary of the smoothed model. The symbols indicate the classification by
the original model: a single red circle is very close to many blue stars. The smoothed model has a
smoother classification boundary which flips the classification of the outlier.
capture an ensemble with a single model, in the special case of Gaussian smoothing, we can
do so, due to specific properties of Gaussian averaging. Our deterministic smoothed model
arises by training a regularized loss, which we call HeatSmoothing. Our work relies on the
insight, known since the early days of neural networks (Bishop, 1995; LeCun et al., 1998),
that gradient regularization is equivalent to Gaussian smoothing.
Formally this is stated as follows.
Theorem 1. (Bishop, 1995) Training a model using the quadratic loss, with added Gaussian
noise of variance σ2 to the inputs, is equivalent to training with
Ex
[‖f(x)− y‖2 + σ2‖∇f(x)‖2] (3)
up to higher order terms.
The proof is deferred to Appendix A; a similar result is available with the cross-entropy loss.
The result from Theorem 1 gives an equivalence which is normally used to go from models
augmented with Gaussian noise to regularized models. In our case, we use the result in the
other direction: we train a regularized model in order to produce a model which is equivalent
to evaluating with noise. In practice, this means that rather than adding noise to regularize
models for certifiable robustness, we explicitly perform a type of gradient regularization, in
order to produce a model which performs as if Gaussian noise was added. See Figure 1 for
an illustration of the effect of this gradient regularization.
To our knowledge, our method is the first deterministic Gaussian smoothing certification
technique. The main appeal of our approach is a large decrease in the number of function
evaluations for computing certifiably robust models, and a corresponding decrease in compute
time at inference. Rather than stochastically sampling many times from a Gaussian at
inference time, our method is certifiably robust with only a single model query. Our
improvement in inference time is achieved by iterative retraining of the model so that model
predictions are equal to the local Gaussian average of the model. Although this iterative
retraining procedure can be time consuming, we argue that trading inference time for training
time will be beneficial in many use case scenarios.
2 Related work
The issue of adversarial vulnerability arose in the works of Szegedy et al. (2014) and
Goodfellow et al. (2015), and has spawned a vast body of research. In terms of certification,
early work by Cheng et al. (2017) provided a method of computing maximum perturbation
bounds for neural networks, and reduced to solving a mixed integer optimization problem.
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Figure 2: Illustration of performing the iterative model update (4) for 5 timesteps in the binary
classification setting. The dashed black line represents our decision boundary. The blue line represents
our current classification model. The blue stars and red circles represent our predicted classes using
the current model iteration. Consider the datapoint at x = −0.5. In the initial model f0, the
adversarial distance is ≈ 0.10. In model f5, the adversarial distance is increased to ≈ 0.35.
Weng et al. (2018a) introduced non-trivial robustness bounds for fully connected networks,
and provided tight robustness bounds at low computational cost. Weng et al. (2018b)
proposed a metric that has theoretical grounding based on Lipschitz continuity of the
classifier model and is scaleable to state-of-the-art ImageNet neural network classifiers.
Zhang et al. (2018) proposed a general framework to certify neural networks based on linear
and quadratic bounding techniques on the activation functions, which is more flexible than
its predecessors.
Training a neural network with Gaussian noise has been shown to be equivalent to gradient
regularization (Bishop, 1995). This helps improve robustness of models; however, there have
been recent using noise for certification purposes. Lécuyer et al. (2019) first considered
adding random Gaussian noise as a certifiable defense in a method called PixelDP. In their
method, they take a known neural network architecture and add a layer of random noise
to make the model’s output random. The expected classification is in turn more robust to
adversarial perturbations. Furthermore, their defense is a certified defense, meaning they
provide a lower bound on the amount of adversarial perturbations for which their defense will
always work. In a following work, Li et al. (2018) provided a defense with improved certified
robustness. The certification guarantees given in these two papers are loose, meaning the
defended model will always be more robust than the certification bound indicates.
In contrast, Cohen et al. (2019) provided a defense utilizing randomized Gaussian smoothing
that leads to tight robustness guarantees under the `2 norm. Moreover Cohen et al. used
Monte Carlo sampling to compute the radius in which a model’s prediction is unchanged; we
refer to this method as RandomizedSmoothing. In work building on Cohen et al., Salman
et al. (2019) developed an adversarial training framework called SmoothAdv and defined a
Lipschitz constant of averaged models. Yang et al. (2020) generalize previous randomized
smoothing methods by providing robustness guarantees in the `1, `2, and `∞ norms for
smoothing with several non-Gaussian distributions.
3 Deterministic Smoothing
Suppose we are given a dataset consisting of paired samples (x, y) ∈ X × Y where x is an
example with corresponding true classification y. The supervised learning approach trains a
model f : X −→ RNc which maps images to a vector whose length equals the number of
classes. Suppose f is the initial model, and let v be the averaged model given by equation
(2). Cohen et al. (2019) find a Gaussian smoothed classification model v by sampling
η ∼ N (0, σ2I) independently n times, performing n classifications, and then computing
the most popular classification. In the randomized smoothing method, the initial model f
is trained on data which is augmented with Gaussian noise to improve accuracy on noisy
images.
We take a different approach to Gaussian smoothing. Starting from an accurate pretrained
model f , we now discard the training labels, and iteratively retrain a new model, fk using
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a quadratic loss between the present iterate fk and the new model’s predictions, with an
additional gradient regularization term. We have found that discarding the original one-hot
labels and instead using model predictions helps make the model smoother.
To be precise, our iterative retraining procedure is given by
fk+1 = argmin
v
Ex
[
1
2
∥∥v(x)− fk(x)∥∥22 + λhσ22 ‖∇xv(x)‖22
]
(4)
We set f0(x) = f(x), the initial model, and generate an iterative sequence of retrained
models for k = 0, . . . , nT − 1, where nT is the number of retraining steps. In (4), h = 1/nT
and λ > 0 is a scaling hyperparameter. At each retraining step, the retrained model is
progressively smoothed by gradient regularization, while being encouraged to remain faithful
to the underlying base model via the quadratic loss. This is illustrated in Figure 2.
3.1 Algorithmic details
Note that the ‖∇xv(x)‖22 term in (4) requires the computation of a Jacobian matrix norm.
In high dimensions this is computationally expensive. To approximate this term, we make
use of the Johnson-Lindenstrauss lemma (Johnson and Lindenstrauss, 1984; Vempala, 2005)
followed by the finite difference approximation from Finlay and Oberman (2019). We are
able to approximate ‖∇xv(x)‖22 by taking the average of the product of the Jacobian matrix
and Gaussian noise vectors. Jacobian-vector products can be easily computed via reverse
mode automatic differentiation, by moving the noise vector w inside:
w · (∇xv(x)) = ∇x (w · v(x)) (5)
Further computation expense is reduced by using finite-differences to approximate the norm
of the gradient. Once the finite-difference is computed, we detach this term from the
automatic differentiation computation graph, further speeding training. More details of our
implementation of these approximation techniques are presented in Appendix C.
We have found that early on in training, the distance value 12
∥∥v(x)− fk(x)∥∥22 may be far
greater than the hσ22 ‖∇xv(x)‖22 term. We introduce a scaling term λ > 0 to correct this. We
perform the training minimization of (4) nT times for k = 0, . . . , nT − 1, for a set number
epochs at each timestep k. The pseudo-code1 for our neural network weight update is given
by Algorithm 1.
3.2 Certified Radii
To assess how well our model approximates the Gaussian average of the initial model, we
compute the certified `2 radius introduced in Cohen et al. (2019). A larger radius implies a
better approximation of the Gaussian average of the initial model. We compare our models
with stochastically averaged models via certified accuracy. This is the fraction of the test set
which a model correctly classifies at a given radius while ignoring abstained classifications.
Throughout, we always use the same σ value for certification as for training.
In conjunction with the certification technique of Cohen et al., we also provide the following
theorem, which describes a bound based on the Lipschitz constant of a Gaussian averaged
model. We refer to this bound as the L-bound.
Theorem 2 (L-bound). Suppose v is the convolution (average) of f : Rd → [0, 1]Nc with a
Gaussian kernel of variance σ2I,
v(x) =
(
f ∗ N (0, σ2I)) (x)
Then any perturbation δ which results in a change of rank of the k-th component of v(x)
must have norm bounded as follows:
‖δ‖2 ≥ σ(pi/2)1/2(v(x)(k) − v(x)(k+1)) (6)
where v(x)(i) is the ith largest value in the vector v(x) ∈ [0, 1]Nc.
See Appendix D for proof. This bound is equally applicable to deterministic or stochastically
averaged models. In stochastically averaged models v(x) is replaced by Eη∼N (0,σ2I) [f(x+ η)].
1Code is publicly available at https://github.com/ryancampbell514/HeatSmoothing.
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Algorithm 1: HeatSmoothing Neural Network Weight Update
Input :Minibatch of input examples x(mb) =
(
x(1), . . . , x(Nb)
)
A model v set to “train” mode
Current model fk set to “eval” mode
σ, standard deviation of Gaussian smoothing
κ, number of Gaussian noise replications (default= 10)
δ, finite difference step-size (default= 0.1)
nT , total number of timesteps being executed (default= 5)
λ ≥ 1, scaling hyperparameter
Update : learning-rate according to a pre-defined scheduler.
for i ∈ {1, . . . Nb} do
Compute : v(x(i)), fk(x(i)) ∈ RNc
Ji = 12
∥∥v(x(i))− fk(x(i))∥∥22 ∈ R
for j ∈ {1, . . . κ} do
Generate w = 1√
Nc
(w1, . . . , wNc), w1, . . . , wNc ∈ N (0, 1)
Compute l via (19), detach x(i) from the computation graph
Ji ← Ji + λ σ22nT
(
w·v(x(i)+δl)−w·v(x(i))
δ
)2
end
J ← 1Nb
Nb∑
i=1
Ji
end
Update the weights of v by running backpropagation on J at the current learning rate.
3.3 Theoretical Details
We appeal to partial differential equations (PDE) theory for explaining the equivalence
between gradient regularization and Gaussian convolution (averaging) of the model2. The
idea is that the gradient term which appears in the loss leads to a smoothing of the new
function (model). The fact that the exact form of the smoothing corresponds to Gaussian
convolution is a mathematical results which can be interpreted probabilistically or using
techniques from analysis. Briefly, we detail the link as follows.
Einstein (1906) showed that the function value of an averaged model under Brownian motion
is related to the heat equation (a PDE); the theory of stochastic differential equations makes
this rigorous (Karatzas and Shreve, 1998). Moreover, solutions of the heat equation are
given by Gaussian convolution with the original model. Crucially, in addition solutions of
the heat equation can be interpreted as iterations of a regularized loss problem (called a
variational energy) like that of Equation 4. The minimizer of this variational energy (4)
satisfies an equation which is formally equivalent to the heat equation (Gelfand et al., 2000).
Thus, taking these facts together, we see that a few steps of the minimization of the loss
in (4) yield a model which approximately satisfies the heat equation, and corresponds to a
model smoothed by Gaussian convolution. See Figure 1 for an illustration of a few steps of
the training procedure. This result is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. (Strauss, 2007) Let f be a bounded function, x ∈ Rd, and η ∼ N (0, σ2I).
Then the following are equivalent:
1. Eη [f(x+ η)], the expected value of Gaussian averages of f at x.
2.
(
f ∗ N (0, σ2I)) (x), the convolution of f with the density of the N (0, σ2I) distribu-
tion evaluated at x.
2We sometimes interchange the terms Gaussian averaging and Gaussian convolution; they are
equivalent, as shown in Theorem 3.
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3. The functions defined in 1. and 2. are solutions of the heat equation,
∂
∂t
f(x, t) = σ
2
2 ∆xf(x, t) (7)
at time t = 1, with initial condition f(x, 0) = f(x).
In Appendix B, we use Theorem 3 to show the equivalence of training with noise and
iteratively training (4).
3.4 Adversarial Attacks
To test how robust our model is to adversarial examples, we calculate the minimum `2
adversarial via our L-bound and we attack our models using the projected gradient descent
(PGD) (Kurakin et al., 2017; Madry et al., 2018) and decoupled direction and norm (DDN)
(Rony et al., 2019) methods. These attacks are chosen because there is a specific way they
can be applied to stochastically averaged models (Salman et al., 2019). In both attacks, it is
standard to take the step
g = α ∇δtL (f(x+ δt), y)‖∇δtL (f(x+ δt), y)‖2
(8)
in the iterative algorithm. Here, x is an input example with corresponding true class y; δt
denotes the adversarial perturbation at its current iteration; L denotes the cross-entropy
Loss function (or KL Divergence); ε is the maximum perturbation allowed; and α is the
step-size. In the stochastically averaged model setting, the step is given by
gn = α
n∑
i=1
∇δtL (f(x+ δt + ηi), y)∥∥∥∥ n∑
i=1
∇δtL (f(x+ δt + ηi), y)
∥∥∥∥
2
(9)
where η1, . . . , ηn
iid∼ N (0, σ2I). For our deterministically averaged models, we implement
the update (8). This is because our models are deterministic, meaning there is no need to
sample noise at evaluation time. For stochastically averaged models (Cohen et al., 2019;
Salman et al., 2019), we implement the update (9).
4 Experiments & Results
4.1 CIFAR-10
We begin by testing our method on the CIFAR-10 dataset (Krizhevsky et al., 2009) with
the ResNet-34 model architecture. The initial model f was trained for 200 epochs with
the cross-entropy loss function. Our smoothed model v was computed by setting f0 = f
and running Algorithm 1 with σ = 0.1 and λ = 5 for nT = 5 timesteps at 200 epochs
each timestep. The training of our smoothed model took 5 times longer than the baseline
model. We compare our results to a ResNet-34 model trained with σ = 0.1 noisy examples as
stochastically averaged model using RandomizedSmoothing (Cohen et al., 2019). We also
trained a SmoothAdv model (Salman et al., 2019) for 4 steps of PGD with the maximum
perturbation set to ε = 0.5. To assess certified accuracy, we run the Certify algorithm
from Cohen et al. (2019) with n0 = 100, n = 10, 000, σ = 0.1 for the stochastically trained
models. For the HeatSmoothing model, we run the same certification algorithm, but
without running SamplingUnderNoise to compute cˆA. For completeness, we also certify
the baseline model f0. Certification plots are presented in Figure 3a. In this plot, we see
that our model’s `2 certified accuracy outperforms the stochastic models. Next, we attack
our four models using PGD and DDN. We run both attacks with 20 steps and maximum
perturbation ε = 4.0 to force top-1 misclassification. Results are presented in Table 1 and
Figures 4a and 4c. In Table 1, we see that HeatSmoothing outperforms the stochastic
models in terms of robustness. The only exception is robustness to mean PGD perturbations.
This is shown in Figures 4a. Our model performs well up to an `2 PGD perturbation of just
above 1.0.
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(a) CIFAR-10 top-1 certified accuracy (b) ImageNet-1k top-5 certified accuracy
Figure 3: Certified accuracy as a function of `2 radius.
Table 1: `2 adversarial distance metrics on CIFAR-10. A larger distance implies a more robust
model.
Model L-bound PGD DDN
median mean median mean median mean
HeatSmoothing 0.094 0.085 0.7736 0.9023 0.5358 0.6361
SmoothAdv 0.090 0.078 0.7697 1.3241 0.4812 0.6208
RandomizedSmoothing 0.087 0.081 0.7425 1.2677 0.4546 0.5558
Undefended baseline - - 0.7088 0.8390 0.4911 0.5713
4.2 ImageNet-1k
We now execute our method on the ImageNet-1k dataset (Deng et al., 2009) with the
ResNet-50 model architecture. The initial model f was trained for 29 epochs with the
cross-entropy loss function. Our smoothed model v was computed by setting f0 = f and
running Algorithm 1 with σ = 0.25 and λ = 100 for nT = 5 timesteps at 15 epochs each
timestep. This took roughly 2 days per timestep. We note that the 12
∥∥v(x)− fk(x)∥∥22 termis not suitable in the ImageNet-1k setting. This is due to the fact that the output vectors
are too large, so the `2 distance blows up early in training. To remedy this, we replace the
`2 distance with the Kullback-Leiblerd divergence between vectors v(x) and fk(x). Due to
time constraints, we had to terminate training early; however, our model still attains a good
top-5 accuracy.
We compare our results to a pretrained RandomizedSmoothing ResNet-50 model with
σ = 0.25 provided by Cohen et al. (2019). We also compare to a pretrained SmoothAdv
ResNet-50 model trained with 1 step of PGD and with a maximum perturbation of ε = 0.5
with σ = 0.25 provided by Salman et al. (2019). To assess certified accuracy, we run the
Certify algorithm from Cohen et al. (2019) with n0 = 25, n = 1, 000, σ = 0.25 for the
stochastically trained models. As in the CIFAR-10 setting, for the HeatSmoothing model,
we run the same certification algorithm but without running SamplingUnderNoise to
compute cˆA. For completeness, we also certify the baseline model f0. Certification plots are
Table 2: `2 adversarial distance metrics on ImageNet-1k
Model L-bound PGD DDN
median mean median mean median mean
HeatSmoothing 0.076 0.110 2.2857 2.3261 1.0313 1.2102
SmoothAdv 0.160 0.160 3.5643 3.0244 1.1537 1.2850
RandomizedSmoothing 0.200 0.180 2.6787 2.5587 1.2114 1.3412
Undefended baseline - - 1.0313 1.2832 0.8573 0.9864
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(a) CIFAR-10 top-1 PGD (b) ImageNet-1k top-5 PGD
(c) CIFAR-10 top-1 DDN (d) ImageNet-1k top-5 DDN
Figure 4: Attack curves: % of images successfully attacked as a function of `2 adversarial distance.
presented in Figure 3b. We see in this plot that due to the fact that we had to terminate our
training early, our model has a lower certified accuracy compared to the pretrained stochastic
models. Next, we attack our four models using PGD and DDN. We run both attacks until
top-5 misclassification or until 20 steps are reached. Results are presented in Table 2 and
Figures 4b and 4d. We see that our model is comparable to the stochastic models, but does
not outperform them. We expect that with additional training iterations, we will be able to
outperform the stochastic models.
5 Conclusion
Randomized smoothing is a well-known method to achieve a Gaussian average of some initial
neural network. This is desirable to guarantee that a model’s predictions are unchanged
given perturbed input data. In this work, we used a regularized loss to obtain deterministic
Gaussian averaged models. By computing `2 certified radii, we showed that our method is
comparable to previously-known stochastic methods. By attacking our models, we showed
that our method is comparable to known stochastic methods in terms of adversarial robustness
of the resulting averaged model. We also developed a new lower bound on perturbations
necessary to throw off averaged models, and used it as a measure of model robustness. Lastly,
our method is less computationally expensive in terms of inference time (see Appendix E).
Future work includes longer training time of our ImageNet-1k model. We are confident that
once this is done, we will achieve comparable results to randomized smoothing methods on
larger datasets. Secondly, adversarial training can be combined with our training method.
This should result in deterministic averaged models that are also more robust to adversarial
perturbations. Since our method is deterministic, we can adversarially train with any attack
we choose without having to modify them to a stochastic averaging framework.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. For clarity we treat the function as one dimensional. A similar calculation can be
done in the higher dimensional case. Apply the Taylor expansion to the quadratic loss
(f(x+ v)− y)2, to give
f(x+ η) = f(x) + ηfx +
1
2η
2fxx +O(η3)
Keeping only the lowest order terms, in η and the lowest order derivatives, we obtain
(f(x+ η)− y)2 = (f(x)− y)2 + 2(fxη + 12η
2fxx)(f(x)− y) + higher order terms (10)
Take expectation
E
[
(f(x+ η)− y)2] = E [(f(x)− y)2]+ σ2(fx)2 + higher order terms (11)
to drop the terms with odd powers of v gives (3).
B Solving the heat equation by training with a regularized loss
function
Theorem 3 tells us that training a model with added Gaussian noise is equivalent to training
a model to solve the heat equation. We can discretize the heat equation (7) to obtain
fk+1 − fk
h
= σ
2
2 ∆f
k+1 (12)
for k = 0, . . . , nT − 1, where nT is the fixed number of timesteps, h = 1/nT , and f0 = f , our
initial model. Notice how, using the Euler-Lagrange equation, we can express fk+1 in (12)
as the variational problem
fk+1 = argmin
v
1
2
∫
Rd
(∣∣v(x)− fk(x)∣∣2 + hσ22 ‖∇xv(x)‖22
)
ρ(x)dx (13)
where ρ is the density from which our clean data comes form. Therefore, this is equivalent
to solving
fk+1 = argmin
v
Ex
[∣∣v(x)− fk(x)∣∣2 + hσ22 ‖∇xv(x)‖22
]
(14)
Note that the minimizer of the objective of (13) satisfies
v − fk = hσ
2
2 ∆v (15)
which matches (12) if we set fk+1 = v. In the derivation of (15), we take for granted the
fact that empirically, ρ is approximately uniform and is therefore constant. In the end, we
iteratively compute (14) and obtain models f1, . . . , fnT , setting v = fnT , our smoothed
model.
Something to take note of is that our model outputs be vectors whose length corresponds to
the total number of classes; therefore, the objective function in (14) will not be suitable for
vector-valued outputs fk(x) and v(x). We instead use the following update
fk+1 = argmin
v
Ex
[
1
2
∥∥v(x)− fk(x)∥∥22 + hσ22 ‖∇xv(x)‖22
]
(16)
C Approximating the gradient-norm regularization term
By the Johnson-Lindenstrauss Lemma (Johnson and Lindenstrauss, 1984; Vempala, 2005),
‖∇xv(x)‖22 has the following approximation,
‖∇xv(x)‖22 ≈
κ∑
i=1
‖∇x (wi · v(x))‖22
≈
κ∑
i=1
(
(wi · v (x+ δli))− (wi · v(x))
δ
)2 (17)
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where
wi =
1√
K
(wi1, . . . , wiK)T ∈ RK , wij iid∼ N (0, 1) (18)
and l is given by
li =
{ ∇x(wi·v(x))
‖∇x(wi·v(x))‖2 if ∇x (wi · v(x)) 6= 0
0 otherwise
(19)
In practice, we set δ = 0.1, κ = 10, and K = Nc, the total number of classes.
D Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Suppose the loss function ` is Lipschitz continuous with respect to model input x,
with Lipschitz constant L. Let `0 be such that if `(x) < `0, the model is always correct.
Then by Proposition 2.2 in Finlay and Oberman (2019), a lower bound on the minimum
magnitude of perturbation δ necessary to adversarially perturb an image x is given by
‖δ‖2 ≥
max {`0 − `(x), 0}
L
(20)
By Lemma 1 of Appendix A in Salman et al. (2019), our averaged model
v(x) =
(
f ∗ N (0, σ2I)) (x)
has Lipschitz constant L = 1σ
√
2
pi . Replacing L in (20) with
1
σ
√
2
pi and setting `0 = v(x)(k),
`(x) = v(x)(k+1) gives us the proof.
E Model inference computation time
In Tables 3 and 4, we present the average time it takes to perform classification and
certification of an image on the CPU and GPU, respectively. For certification, we implement
theCertify algorithm from Cohen et al. (2019). On CIFAR-10, we use the top-1 classification
setting while on ImageNet-1k, we use top-5 classification.
Table 3: Average classification & certification time on the CPU (seconds)
Model Classification Certification
CIFAR-10 ImageNet-1k CIFAR-10 ImageNet-1k
HeatSmoothing 0.0049 0.0615 13.5994 3.2475
RandomizedSmoothing 0.0480 0.1631 13.7394 3.3938
Table 4: Average classification & certification time on the GPU (seconds)
Model Classification Certification
CIFAR-10 ImageNet-1k CIFAR-10 ImageNet-1k
HeatSmoothing 0.0080 0.0113 0.3786 2.6624
RandomizedSmoothing 0.0399 0.0932 0.4142 2.8690
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